University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

Faculty Publications

9-12-2012

Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on “The Citizens United
Court and the Continuing Importance of the Voting Rights Act”
Anthony Johnstone
Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, anthony.johnstone@umontana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Johnstone, Anthony, "Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on “The Citizens United Court and the
Continuing Importance of the Voting Rights Act”" (2012). Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings. 97.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals/97

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at ScholarWorks
at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Testimony of
Anthony Johnstone
Assistant Professor
University of Montana School of Law
Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearing on
“The Citizens United Court and
the Continuing Importance of the Voting Rights Act”
September 12, 2012
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,
My testimony today concerns the role of the Supreme Court in
reviewing the constitutionality of “laws of democracy,” including
campaign finance regulation, election administration, and voting
rights enforcement. I will compare the different approaches the Court
has taken toward two controversies, corporate campaign spending and
voter identification laws, and attempt to draw some lessons from the
comparison for the Court’s pending review of the Voting Rights Act.
INTRODUCTION
Before taking my current position, I was honored to serve the People
of Montana as the State’s Solicitor, where I assisted the Attorney
General in defending our laws against constitutional challenges. In
that position I developed a deep respect for the democratic process.
That process—this process at work here today—is grounded in a
principle of popular sovereignty that is the first right declared in our
Montana Constitution.1 The same principle is reflected in our national
Constitution that puts “We the People” first,2 followed by Congress,3
next the President,4 and then the “judicial Power … vested in one
supreme Court.”5
“All political power is vested in and derived from the people. All government of
right originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted
solely for the good of the whole.” MONT. CONST. Art. II, § 1.
2 U.S. CONST., Preamble.
3 U.S. CONST., Art. I.
4 U.S. CONST., Art. II.
5 U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 1.
1

My final case for the State was a defense of a law called the Corrupt
Practices Act.6 At the turn of the last century, Montana stood in the
grips of “corporate dictation and corruption,” in the words of one
contemporary newspaper. 7 Montana’s “general aura of corruption”
extended to this body, a committee of which “expressed horror at the
amount of money which had been poured into politics in Montana,” and
urged the expulsion of Montana’s newly elected Senator William A.
Clark for bribery and corruption.8 One hundred years ago, Montanans
recognized this corruption for what it was, called it as they saw it, and
did something about it. By initiative, three-quarters of Montana voters,
including farmers, ranchers, miners, businessmen, Democrats and
Republicans alike, enacted the Corrupt Practices Act of 1912.9 For a
century, that law ensured democratic accountability by requiring
individuals—real people—to stand behind campaign money spent on
behalf of their corporate interests.
This year, the Supreme Court ended this tradition in a case named,
ironically, American Tradition Partnership. After our Montana
Supreme Court upheld the Corrupt Practices Act in a detailed opinion
applying the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the undisputed
facts before it,10 and after twenty-two States led by a bipartisan set of
attorneys general joined Montana in seeking a hearing,11 the Supreme
Court summarily reversed in an unsigned opinion, five-to-four.12 The
Court did not allow briefing on the merits, hold a hearing, or review
the record in the case.13 Here was an extraordinary exercise of the
Init. Act. Nov. 1912, § 25.
Miles Romney, A Better Era Dawning, Western News (Hamilton, Mont.) 2 (April 4,
1911); see generally Jeff Wiltse, The Origins of Montana's Corrupt Practices Act: A
More Complete History, 73 MONT. L. REV. __ (2012) (forthcoming); Larry Howell, Once
Upon a Time in the West: Citizens United, Caperton, and the War of the Copper Kings,
73 MONT. L. REV. 25 (2012).
8 K. Ross Toole, Montana: An Uncommon Land, 191 (Univ. Okla. 1959); see
generally, Report of the Committee on Privileges and Elections of the United States
Senate, Relative to the Right and Title of William A. Clark to as Seat as Senator from
Montana, S. REP. NO. 56-1052 (1900).
9 See Mont. Sec’y of State, Statutory Initiative and Referendum Issues Since
Adoption of the Constitutional Amendment, Article V, Section I, Permitting the
Referendum and Initiative, available at http://sos.mt.gov/elections/Ballot_Issues/
initandref2010tbl.pdf (2010).
10 Western Tradition Partnership v. Attorney General, 2011 MT 328, 271 P.3d 1
(Mont. 2011).
11 Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (No. 11-1179).
12 American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
13 Docket, American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012)
(No. 11-1179).
6
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judicial power. This decision may be the first time in decades that a
divided Court summarily struck down a state law on constitutional
grounds.14 The four dissenters, led by Justice Breyer, so doubted the
majority’s willingness “to reconsider Citizens United,” despite the
“grave doubt” experience cast “on the Court’s supposition that
independent expenditures do not corrupt,” that they voted to deny
review rather than participate in the summary reversal.15
What does Montana’s experience tell us about this Supreme Court,
as this hearing’s title puts it, “the Citizens United Court”? To answer
this question, we can contrast the Court’s approach to campaign
finance laws in Citizens United and the Montana case with its
approach to voter identification laws in a 2008 case, Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board.16 These cases bear basic similarities in
the laws and rights at issue, and telling differences in the scrutiny the
Court applies.
THE RIGHTS TO CAMPAIGN AND TO VOTE
Both Crawford and Citizens United involve fundamental rights. The
freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment17 protects a
right to campaign spending because “[i]n a republic where the people
are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices
among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who
are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a
nation.”18 The First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 19 protect a right of equal access to voting
See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Tax Commissioner of West Virginia, 497 U.S. 916 (1990)
(per curiam) (holding state tax law unconstitutional under retroactive effect of prior
decision); El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993) (per curiam)
(holding state rule of criminal procedure unconstitutional under First Amendment).
Cf. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam)
(holding state statute preempted by Federal Arbitration Act). One commentator
found the last time such a narrowly divided Court summarily reversed a state court
with so little reasoning was in 1966. See Riggan v. Virginia, 384 U.S. 152 (1966); see
also Steve Vladeck, Prawfsblawg, The Math of 5-4 Summary Reversals (or, What I
Don’t Get About Bullock), Comment of Samuel Feldman (Jun. 27, 2012), available at
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/06/the-math-of-5-4-summaryreversals.html.
15 American Tradition Partnership, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2492 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (plurality opinion).
17 “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST.
Amend. I.
18 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876,
898 (2010) (relying on Buckley).
19 “No State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.” U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1.
14

3

because “the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights.”20
Neither the right to campaign nor the right to vote is absolute,
however. Often, when a law implicates these rights, “constitutionally
protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation.” 21 In
campaign finance, for example, “corruption is a constant source of
danger” to “a republican government, like ours, where political power
is reposed in representatives of the entire body of the people.” 22
Moreover, campaign finance laws also facilitate free speech by
“enabl[ing] the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper
weight to different speakers and messages.” In election administration,
“[c]ommon sense as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion
that government must play an active role in structuring elections … if
they are to be fair and honest.”23
THE THREATS OF CORRUPTION AND FRAUD
It should come as no surprise, then, that supporters of laws like
campaign finance regulation and voter identification requirements
invoke these countervailing constitutional interests to justify any
burden on the rights to campaign or to vote. Supporters of campaign
finance regulation claim that the law should prevent corruption of the
political process, and the Court has recognized this threat as a
sufficient justification for the constitutional burdens imposed by
certain campaign finance laws. 24 Supporters of voter identification
requirements claim that the law should prevent voter fraud, and the
Court has recognized this threat as sufficient for certain election
administration laws.25
These claims of political corruption and voter fraud are widely and
deeply contested. I do not want to enter that debate today except to
note some parallels between the two claims. Both are widely
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1960), quoting Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992)
(“voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure”);
see also Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1615-16 (plurality opinion) (relying on Harper and
Burdick).
21 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
22 Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547 (1934), quoting Ex Parte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 666 (1884).
23 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
24 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 (upholding campaign contribution limits).
25 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1619 (plurality opinion) (rejecting facial challenge to voter
identification law).
20
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recognized as problems by the electorate and, relatedly, both are
played to partisan advantage in politics.26 Yet both political corruption
and voter fraud can be difficult to detect, and neither is a sufficiently
definite problem to lead to a consensus solution. So, as the Court in
Citizens United observed, about half of the States regulated corporate
campaign spending and half did not.27 To some, these laws ban core
political speech by censoring corporations; to others, these laws
preserve the integrity of the democratic process by requiring the filing
of a simple two-page form. 28 Thirty-three States passed voter
identification laws of varying strictness, about half of which require
photo identification. 29 To some, these laws impose modern-day poll
taxes by conditioning the franchise on the time and expense of a visit
to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles; to others, again, these laws preserve
the integrity of the democratic process by requiring the filing of a
simple two-page form.30 As this Committee knows from its hearings
this past summer, reasonable people can and do disagree about the ills
of corruption and fraud in electoral politics, and the appropriate
remedies, if any.31
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND SUSPICION
Given this, what should a court do when confronted with a
constitutional challenge to laws at the center of the democratic
process? This Court gives us two examples of how to answer that
question in Crawford and Citizens United: deference or suspicion.
In Crawford, the Court defers to the legislature. It does not question
“the legitimacy or importance of the State’s interest in counting only
the votes of eligible voters,” or weigh the risk of voter fraud.32 Besides,
it says, “[f]or most voters who need them, the inconvenience of making
26 See, e.g., Brent Zongker, Most oppose unlimited corporate campaign spending,
ASSOC. PRESS (July 17, 2012); Michael Brandon & John Cohen, Poll: Voter ID laws
have support of a majority of Americans, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2012.
27 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908-909.
28 See Commissioner of Political Practices, Form C-2, available at
http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/content/pdf/5cfp/fillC-2COMPLETE2012-6rev.
29 Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, Voter Identification Requirements (Sept. 5,
2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/voter-id.aspx.
30 See Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation, Application for Initial Identification
Card, available at http://www.dmv.state.pa.us/pdotforms/dl_forms/dl-54a.pdf. A
second form is required if the voter lacks proof of identification.
31 See, e.g., Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Taking Back Our Democracy:
Responding to Citizens United and the Rise of Super PACs, 112th Cong. (July 24,
2012); Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Prohibiting the Use of Deceptive Practices and
Voter Intimidation Tactics in Federal Elections: S. 1994, 112th Cong. (June 26, 2012).
32 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1619 (plurality opinion).

5

a trip to the BMV, gathering the required documents, and posing for a
photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial burden on the right
to vote.”33 The Court could take a similarly deferential approach to
Citizens United (as the dissent does). The Court might recognize that
“Congress surely has both wisdom and experience in these matters
that is far superior to ours.”34 Complying with the law through the
political committee form “entails some administrative burden,” but “no
one has suggested that the burden is severe for a sophisticated forprofit corporation,” and “[t]he owners of a ‘mom & pop’ store can simply
place ads in their own names.”35 Meanwhile, “[c]orruption can take
many forms,” and “the record Congress developed … stands as a
remarkable testament to the energy and ingenuity with which
corporations, unions, lobbyists, and politicians may go about scratching
each other’s backs.”36 Deference thus respects the democratic process.
In Citizens United, the Court suspects Congress. The Court finds
such laws “ban the political speech of millions of associations of
citizens,” and speculates “the result [of the law] is that smaller or
nonprofit corporations cannot raise a voice to object when other
corporations, including those with vast wealth, are cooperating with
the Government.”37 It asserts “independent expenditures do not lead to,
or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption.”38 Again, the
Court could be equally suspicious in Crawford (as the dissent is). It
could assume that a voting “nondriver, most likely to be poor, elderly,
or disabled, will find it difficult and expensive to travel to the Bureau
of Motor Vehicles.”39 The factual justification for the law, it might note,
is especially weak given “that the State has not come across a single
instance of in-person voter impersonation fraud” in its history. 40
Suspicion thus questions the democratic process.
There is another approach the Court traditionally takes. Sometimes
it adopts a double standard of scrutiny depending on whether or not
there are independent reasons to respect or question the democratic
process. For example, in the Carolene Products “footnote four”
formulation, the Court might be more suspicious of a law that
“restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
Id. at 1621 (plurality opinion).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 969 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted).
35 Id., at 943 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36 Id., at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37 Id., at 907.
38 Id. at 910.
39 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 1637 (Souter, J., dissenting).
33
34
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bring about repeal of undesirable legislation” or “tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities.”41 This approach assumes that courts in
general are less capable of representing our constitutional values than
the political branches, and narrows the focus of judicial review to only
those cases where the democratic process malfunctions in some
important way.
In Citizens United, the Court gives little reason to suspect the
democratic process that results in a corporate campaign spending law.
Due to their state-conferred organizational advantages and relative
wealth, corporations are especially effective at influencing legislation.42
The federal law also is the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, after all,
and if the law has any effect on incumbents it might be to weaken the
capacity of corporate interests to entrench incumbents who favor the
status quo.43 In Crawford, on the other hand, the Court has several
reasons to suspect the democratic process leading to the voter
identification requirement. “Partisan considerations may have played
a significant role in the decision to enact” the law, which the
legislature enacted on a straight party-line vote.44 The impact of the
law, meanwhile, disproportionately falls on “the poor and the weak,”
who may be deterred “from exercising the franchise.”45
But in Crawford and Citizens United, the Supreme Court does not
consistently apply any of these approaches to judicial review. It
upholds the voter identification law and strikes down the corporate
campaign spending law. Instead of deference or suspicion, or the
traditional double standard, it applies a new double standard. The new
standard demotes the right to vote of the relatively underrepresented
individuals subject to the voter identification law in Crawford, and
promotes the right to speak of the relatively well-represented
corporations subject to the campaign finance law in Citizens United.
The Court’s decision whether to approach these laws with deference or
suspicion is what matters most to the outcome of these cases, not the
legislature’s purpose or the parties’ proof of facts, much less the text or
history of the Constitution. To the extent we can call this Court “The
Citizens United Court,” one of its distinguishing characteristics is this
new double standard.

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43 See id. at 969-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623-24.
45 Id. at 1643 (Souter, J., dissenting).
41
42
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DEFERENCE, DEMOCRACY, AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
This brings us to the Voting Rights Act. In 1965, this building’s
namesake introduced the Act with a great Montanan, Senate Majority
Leader Mike Mansfield, a graduate of and former professor at the
University of Montana. The Act passed overwhelmingly. As the
Supreme Court recently observed, “the historic accomplishments of the
Voting Rights Act are undeniable.”46 The fact that it was an Act of
Congress, and not a judgment of the Supreme Court, facilitated these
accomplishments. Through civil rights enforcement legislation,
Congress offers courts a way out of the choice between deference and
suspicion. Appropriate legislation enforcing Constitutional guarantees
strengthens rights by grounding them in democratic legitimacy. 47
When Congress enforces the right to vote, for example, it can consider
a broader factual record, draw on a more representative body of
national values, and provide more effective and flexible remedies, than
the Supreme Court can on its own. Indeed, throughout our history
Congress, through the proposal of constitutional amendments and
enactment of civil rights legislation like the Voting Rights Act, has
shown itself to be at least as effective a guarantor of our constitutional
rights as the Supreme Court.
Yet the Court recently noted that the Act’s preclearance
requirements, reauthorized and amended in 2006, “raise serious
constitutional questions.” 48 Constitutional challenges to the Act are
now pending before the Supreme Court.49 In light of the discussion
above, the issue these challenges pose is not whether these
constitutional questions should be resolved, but where and on what
basis. There are reasons for the Court to defer these questions to the
democratic process. The 2006 reauthorization and amendments to the
Voting Rights Act passed Congress by wider margins than the original
Act.50 If the Supreme Court suspects this process and invalidates the
Act, we should expect it to explain why the Court has a better
understanding of our constitutionally guaranteed voting rights than
Congress, which most directly speaks for We the People.

Northwest Austin Mun. Utility Dist. v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2511 (2009).
See U.S. CONST., Amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.”); see also U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV, § 5.
48 Id. at 2513.
49 See, e.g., Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
petition for cert. filed (No. 12-96); Nix v. Holder, 679 F.3d 905 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
petition for cert. filed (No. 12-81).
50 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-246 (2006).
46
47
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